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1 Introduction
When multinational firms invest abroad, they surprisingly often do not operate with the
same organisational form as their parent firms in the home country. Table 1 documents
for the first time that in about 50 percent of foreign investments, multinational firms
do not transplant their parent firms’ mode of organisation to the affiliate firm in the
host country. The numbers shown in Table 1 are based on survey data we designed
and collected on the internal organisation of 660 Austrian and German multinational
firms with 2200 of their affiliates in Eastern Europe (for more details on the survey and
the data, see Section 6.1 and Marin and Rousova (2012)). We collected information
on the hierarchical level of 13 corporate decisions in affiliate and parent firms, such
as decisions on acquisitions, finance, budget, R&D, new strategy, firing of personnel,
etc. (see Table 5 of the Data Appendix B for a full listing of corporate decisions). The
measure of organisational transfer we use is based on the number of corporate decisions
which are taken at the same hierarchical level in affiliate firms as in parent firms. The
organisational form is fully transplanted if each corporate decision obtained the same
hierarchical rank in the affiliate firm as in the parent firm; it is partially transplanted if
from two to four corporate decisions differ, and it is not transplanted if more than five
corporate decisions differ in hierarchical rank in the parent and affiliate firms (see Figure
4 of Appendix B for the frequency of transplanting individual corporate decisions).1
Why are business organisations so little transplanted? Why do the same firms use
different organisations in different markets? Most of the literature on multinational
firms assumes that multinational firms bring technology and organisational skills to
the host countries. In a recent paper, Bloom, Van Reenen, and Sadun (2012) suggest
that multinational firms are more decentralised than domestic firms because they take
with them the more decentralised organisation from their parent firms when they invest
in other countries. But the data on the frequency of exporting the organisational
form to host countries documented in Table 1 does not suggest that organisational
transfer can be taken for granted. The recent literature on international trade shows
that multinational firms tend to be larger and more productive than firms that serve
only the national market (see Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)). The larger firm
size of multinational corporations may itself explain why they operate with a more
decentralised organisation compared to national firms. In fact, two recent papers on
1Alternatively, we consider several measures of transplanting the mode of organisation with similar
results. See Table 8 of Appendix B.
trade and organisation based on different theories of firm hierarchies (see Marin and
Verdier (2010); Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)) predict that larger firms more
exposed to international trade are more decentralised. What then determines whether
or not multinational firms transplant their mode of organisation to other countries?
Table 1: Do Multinationals Transplant their Business Model?
Affiliate Firms with Parent Firm Organisation
Parent Firm in: Transplanted: Total
Not1 Partially1 Fully1 Affiliate Firms
Austria 462 242 178 882
52.4 % 27.4% 20.2% 100%
Germany 200 113 144 453
44.2% 24.9% 30.9% 100%
Total Affiliate Firms 662 355 318 1335
49.6% 26.6% 23.8% 100%
Notes: The table reports the absolute number of cases and row percentages.
1 The degree of full transplantation (full, partial and no transplantation) depends on the number of corporate decisions which are taken
at the same hierarchical level in the parent and subsidiary firms. For a listing of corporate decisions, see Table 5 in Appendix B. The
organisational form is fully transplanted if each corporate decision obtained the same hierarchical rank for the subsidiary firm as for the
parent firm, or if only one corporate decision differs. It is partially transplanted if two to four corporate decisions differ in hierarchical
rank, and the organisational form is not transplanted if five or more corporate decisions are different.
In this paper, we focus on the role of the economic environment in the decision to
export the organisational form to other countries. If ‘corporate culture’ matters, we a
priori expect firms to operate with the same organisational form in the countries they
invest in. Presumably, once the firm has developed an organisational routine which
serves it well, it might as well use this routine in other countries. One possible reason
why this often does not happen is that the economic environment may force firms to
adjust their organisational form to the conditions prevailing in these markets.
To get a first impression on whether the economic environment matters for the
frequency of exporting the business organisation, we look in Table 1 at whether the size
of the home market of multinational firms is correlated with the decision to transplant
their mode of organisation. This is indeed the case. German multinationals, located in
the larger economy, transplant their organisational form significantly more often than
Austrian multinationals, located in the smaller home market.2 Furthermore, in Figure
1 we show that the market size of the host countries in Eastern Europe is correlated
with the frequency with which the parent multinational firm, whether from Austria or
Germany, brings the organisational form with them when they invest in these countries.
The figure ranks the host countries by their size in terms of GDP (with Bosnia the
2Austria has a population of 8 million people, which is 10 percent of that of Germany.
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smallest and Russia the largest) and suggests that multinational firms appear to
transplant their organisational form more often to smaller host markets. Equipped
with this information, we proceed in this paper with a theory in which multinational
firms’ decisions to transplant their organisational form will be described as a function
of the monopolistic competitive environment they face in the home market and in the
host market. We then test this theory with the survey data of 660 multinational firms
and their 2200 affiliate firms in Eastern Europe.
Figure 1: Host Country Size and the Decision to Transplant the Organisational
Form
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Notes: The figure shows the percentage of affiliate firms in a given host country with parent firm organisational form fully transplanted.
Host countries are sorted by the size of GDP from left (smallest GDP) to right (largest GDP). Countries with less than 8 affiliate firms
are not shown.
We model an economy in which a multinational firm decides how to organise
production in the parent and the affiliate firm in a host country. We follow a variant of
Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and model the organisation
of the multinational firm as a knowledge-based hierarchy in which the production
managers in the parent and affiliate firms deal with routine problems and headquarters
(top managers) solve the exceptional problems. Production managers need to acquire
knowledge to solve problems, which is costly. Therefore, it is efficient for the firm to
let the top managers learn how to solve the more uncommon problems. In addition
to solving the problems that the production managers cannot solve, the top managers
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coordinate the projects of the production managers. The coordination costs of the top
managers introduce a size cost to the firm hierarchy. The more problems have to be
solved, the larger is the scale of production, the more time is spent on coordination, and
the less time is available for problem solving. The problem of the firm is to decide on
the size of the hierarchy, the level of decentralisation to production managers, and the
optimal scale of production. A more decentralised organisation of production allows
the firm to save on top managerial wages and communication costs at the expense of
larger training costs for the production managers. We show that, depending on which
of these costs dominate, the optimal scale of production at first rises and then falls
with increasing autonomy of production managers.
We incorporate our multinational firm in a home market with monopolistic
competition with a continuum of differentiated goods. Consumers in the home market
have a linear demand for varieties. Hence, firms determine prices by choosing the size of
the markup endogenously. We then consider how changes in the economic environment
(changes in product markets) affect the output and the level of decentralisation in our
multinational firm. We find that an increase in market size leads to a larger output level
of firms and to more decentralisation (i.e., delegation of decision-making to production
managers), while an increase in the number of competitors leads to lower ouput and less
decentralisation. When the market and the firms’ scale of production become larger,
the top managers are required to coordinate more, which increases the opportunity
costs of their solving problems. As a result, headquarters increases the fraction of
tasks that the production managers have to solve, leading to more delegation and
decentralisation. When competition becomes more intense and firms’ output declines,
less coordination and more supervision is called for, resulting in more centralisation.
Next, we allow our multinational firm to sell its product in a host country through an
affiliate firm which faces monopolistic competition in the host market. We then examine
the conditions under which the multinational firm will use the same organisational
form in the affiliate firm in the host country as in the parent firm in the home country.
The first result of the paper states that the market environment exhibits a powerful
influence on the multinational firms’ decision to transplant their business organisation
to the affiliate firm in the host country. Interestingly, we find that multinational firms
coming from smaller home markets and investing in larger host markets are less likely to
export their form of business organisation to the affiliate firm in the host country. In a
smaller home market, the multinational firm adopts a more centralised hierarchy, since
a smaller ouput allows for more supervision and less coordination by headquarters.
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Assuming that affiliate firms are more decentralised than parent firms (which we
show will prevail when communication costs between parent and affiliate firms are
sufficiently large), more centralisation in the parent multinational firm increases the
organisational gap with the affiliate firm, making it less likely that the organisational
form is transplanted. In a larger host market, it hurts the profits of the affiliate firms
more when they operate with an organisational form that is not optimally adjusted to
the host market conditions. When affiliate firms operate with the same organisational
form as their parent firms in their host markets, each unit of output is sold with a
lower profit margin, reducing total profits when more units of output are sold in the
larger host market.
We find further that multinational firms coming from less competitive home markets
and investing in more competitive host markets are more likely to export their form
of business organisation to the affiliate firms in the host country. In a less competitive
home market, the multinational firm adopts a more decentralised hierarchy, since a
larger ouput allows for less supervision and more coordination by headquarters. More
decentralisation in the parent multinational firm decreases the organisational gap with
the affiliate firm, making it more likely that the organisational form is transplanted.
Similarly, more competition in the host market means that the optimal size of the
affiliate firm shrinks and headquarters allocates less time to coordination and more to
supervision resulting in more centralisation. This decreases the organisational gap with
the parent firm, making it more likely that the organisational form is transplanted.
The second result of the paper states that gravity factors like distance and
communication costs between parent firms and their affiliates affect the probability
of organisational transfer to the host country. An increase in communication costs
has an ambiguous effect on the probability of transplanting the mode of organisation.
On the one hand, more costly communication leads to more decentralisation in the
affiliate firm increasing the organisational gap to the parent firm, and hence lowers
the probability of transplanting the mode of organisation. On the other hand, more
costly communication increases marginal costs of production and reduces profits. The
profit loss is smaller when the firm transplants the organisational mode which increases
the probability of organisational transfer. We show that the first effect dominates the
second effect and, hence organisational transfer is less likely when the home market is
sufficiently large.
Finally, the last result of the paper states that multinational firms with stronger
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corporate culture and more innovative technologies are more likely to transplant the
mode of organisation to the host country. A stronger corporate culture makes a change
of organisation more costly increasing the probability of transplanting the mode of
organisation. When a more innovative technology is transferred to the affiliate firm,
the training costs of production managers in the affiliate firm rise, and hence the affiliate
firm recentralizes to headquarters with a smaller organisational gap to the parent firm
resulting in an increase in the probability of transplanting the organisational mode.
Thus, organisational transfer and technology transfer appear to be complements.
We test the predictions of our theory with original firm survey data we collected and
designed from 660 Austrian and German multinational parent firms with their 2200
affiliate firms in Eastern Europe. In the empirical analysis we test for the probability
of transplanting the organisational form and we show that the estimated coefficients
have mostly the predicted sign and are highly significant at conventional levels. The
market environment variables and gravity factors are economically important for the
probability of organisational transfer to host countries. For example, we find that
when the population ratio of the host to the home country as a measure of relative
market size increases by 1, the probability of transplanting declines by 2 percentage
points. In our data this means that if a German multinational firm moves its affiliate
firm from the smaller Ukraine to the larger Russia, the probability of transplanting
their organisational form declines by 2.4 percentage points. When affiliate firms face
many domestic competitors in their host markets rather than a few, the probability
of transplanting increases by 18.5 percentage points, while many domestic competitors
in the home market of multinational parent firms lower this probability by around 9
percentage points. When the distance between the parent and affiliate firm doubles the
probability of transplanting the organisational mode declines by 8 percentage points.
Moreover, the corporate culture of the multinational firm and the type of technology
transferred to the host country matter for the decision to transplant the mode of
organisation. Multinational firms with human resource policies in place (our measure
of corporate culture) are 37 percentage points more likely, and multinational firms
which transfer an innovative technology to the affiliate firm are 31 percentage points,
respectively, more likely to transfer the organisational mode to the host country.
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While there is a large economic literature which has examined the determinants of
technology transfer between countries (for a recent survey, see Harrison and Rodriguez-
Clare (2010)), research on organisational transfer between countries virtually does
not exist. However, there is a large empirical literature in international business
which emphasizes the tension between the adjustment to local market conditions and
the transfer of intangible assets, of the mode of organisation, and human resource
management practices in multinational firms, see for example Florida and Kenney
(1991), Ferner et al. (2004). Moreover, the literature on the transplantation of culture
between countries which follows the epidemiological approach (see Fernandez (2011)) is
related to what we do in this paper. The epidemiological approach tries to separate the
effect of culture from the economic and institutional environment by studying variations
in outcomes across groups with different cultural backgrounds (immigrants, diplomats)
residing in the same country (see Fernandez and Fogli (2009), and Fisman and Miguel
(2007)). We instead want to understand the role of the economic environment in
corporate outcomes in firms that share the same corporate culture, by coming from
the same multinational parent firms but differing in the economic enviroments faced
by their affiliated firms in their differing host countries.
Our paper is also related to previous research on organisations in international
trade.3 Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and Antras and Helpman (2004) focus
on how firms’ home productivity advantage determines the mode of organisation firms
choose abroad. Antras, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) study the formation
of teams between countries, and Marin and Verdier (2008, 2010, 2012) and Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) examine how a greater exposure to international trade
influences the business model firms choose at home. More recently, an empirical
literature on firm decentralisation has emerged with a focus on national firms. This
literature examines the trend to decentralisation of US firms (Rajan and Wulf (2006)),
how information technology (Bloom, Van Reenen, and Sadun (2012); Acemoglu et al.
(2007)), international trade and competition (Marin and Verdier (2010); Guadalupe
and Wulf (2010); Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)) and trust and religion
(Bloom, Van Reenen, and Sadun (2010)) affect the level of decentralisation of firms.
The present paper is organised into the following sections. Section 2 describes the
product market with monopolisitc competition. Section 3 introduces the organisational
form of the firm as a knowledge hierarchy and derives the optimal scale of production
3For an overview, see Helpman, Marin, and Verdier (2008) and Marin (2012).
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and the optimal level of decentralisation in the firm. Section 4 embeds the optimal
choice of knowledge hierarchy in a one sector economy with monopolistic competition
and examines how the conditions in the product market influence the optimal choice
of the knowledge hierarchy. Section 5 extends the analysis to examine the choice
of a multinational firm operating both in the home market as well as in a host
market through a subsidiary firm. This section derives the conditions under which
the multinational firm will transplant their organisational form to the affiliated firm in
the host market. Section 6 describes the data and the empirical results and Section 7
concludes. The proofs of the main results and the description of the data are relegated
to the Appendix.
2 Product Market
Consider an economy with L consumers whose preferences are defined over a continuum
of differentiated varieties indexed by i ∈ Ω and a homogenous good chosen as the
numďż˝raire. Preferences are given by
U = q0 +
∫
i∈Ω
qidi− 1
2
γ
∫
i∈Ω
q2i di−
1
2
[∫
i∈Ω
qidi
]2
,
where q0 and qi are, respectively, the consumptions of the numeraire and of variety i
of the differentiated good.
Assuming that there are N varieties on the market, utility maximisation for a
typical consumer provides demand for each variety i
di(pi, p) =
1
γ +N
− 1
γ
pi +
N
γ +N
1
γ
p, (1)
where di(pi, p) is the market demand for variety i, γ is the degree of product
differentiation between varieties i, pi is the price of variety i, and p = 1N
∫
i∈Ω pidi
is the average price index p in the differentiated good sector. The aggregate demand
for variety i is simply qi(pi, p) = Ldi(pi, p). Note that in this linear demand system for
varieties, the price elasticity of demand is driven by the toughness of the competition
in the market induced either by a lower average price for varieties p or more product
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varieties N . The price elasticity of demand increases with lower p and larger N .4
Each variety of the differentiated good is produced under monopolistically com-
petitive conditions. Our focus is on one specific firm i operating in this market and
selling a given variety i. We think of this firm as reflecting the headquarters or the
subsidiary of a multinational firm in a specific country. We wish to characterise the
residual demand for that specific firm when it competes with N other local firms j 6= i
(each of them selling one variety of the differentiated product on that same market).
Suppose that all the other firms produce with constant marginal costs c. Then the
profit maximisation of each of these firms is given by
max
pj
pij(pj) = Ldj(pj, p) [pj − c] ,
with profit maximising output level qj = q(c) and price level pj = p(c), respectively, as
qj = q(c) =
L
γ
[pj − c] (2)
with
pj = p(c) =
1
2
[
c+
γ
γ +N
+
N
γ +N
p
]
. (3)
Averaging over all the local competitors’ results in the average price on the market
(when there are enough varieties N) as
p =
1
N
∫
j∈Ω
pjdj = p(c) =
1
2
[
c+
γ
γ +N
+
N
γ +N
p
]
or
p =
c+ γ
γ+N
2γ+N
γ+N
.
Substituting into (1), the multinational firm of our focus i faces an aggregate
demand:
qi(pi, p) =
L
γ +N
− L
γ
pi +N
L
γ
c+ γ
γ+N
2γ +N
4For more details, see Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002).
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or the inverse demand function:
pi = P (qi) =
Nc
γ +N
+
2γ
2γ +N
− γ
L
qi
and the revenue function
R(qi, L,N) = P (qi)qi =
[
Nc
γ +N
+
2γ
2γ +N
− γ
L
qi
]
qi.
This formulation allows us to have a simple parametrisation of the market conditions
(in terms of market size L and number of competitors N) under which our firm i
operates.
3 Knowledge Hierarchies
Let us now consider the decision about the internal organisational form in our multi-
national firm selling its product under monopolistic market conditions. Production is
described as a problem solving and information processing activity, as in Garicano
(2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), who propose a simple theory of
knowledge hierarchies as cognitive devices in which there is a basic trade-off between
communication and information access. In their model, the role of hierarchy is to
facilitate the acquisition of knowledge by increasing its utilisation rate. We use a
simple version of this framework to extend the theory towards a setting with market
competition, international trade, and the multinational firm.
Now consider our firm which competes on a product market as described in the
previous section. To simplify, we abstract from the subscript i. Our firm has an inverse
demand function P (q) where output q is produced with productive labor only.
The firm chooses the hierarchy of the organisation by taking the following
considerations into account. There are two types of managers: production managers
who draw a unit measure of problems (or tasks or decisions) in [0, 1] per unit of
time, and headquarters managers who coordinate the production projects of the middle
managers and also help solve production problems that middle managers are unable
to solve. Production takes place only if all problems are dealt with by someone in the
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organisation and are coordinated at the level of the firm. We normalise to 1 the output
per production manager and per unit of time once problems are solved. The problems
are distributed according to a density function f(z). Without loss of generality, the
problems are ordered such that f ′(z) < 0, i.e., more common problems have a lower
index. Agents can only deal with a problem or task if they have the relevant knowledge.
The training cost of a production manager’s acquiring the knowledge to deal with all
problems with complexity less than z is apz. This cost may depend on the technology
available to different agents, their skill, and local market conditions in the country
where the agent is. The cost of training an agent depends therefore on his autonomy
z (the level of complexity of problems that he can solve). When that autonomy is
reduced, so that the production manager has only the knowledge for dealing with the
most common problems, i.e., those in (0, zp), he asks for help for the more complex
problems (those with z > zp) from top management m who may solve the problem.
We assume that top managers (headquarters) have the necessary skills to be able to
solve problems for all tasks in [0, 1]5.
The value of an additional layer of problem solvers is to reduce the cost of training
workers to higher autonomy levels. It involves, however, several costs. First, the cost of
hierarchy is the time wasted, since problem solvers do not produce output, but instead
use their time to help middle managers solve their problems. Second, top managers
have also to spend time coordinating projects to get effective production. The more
problems have to be solved, the larger the scale of production, the more time is spent
on coordination. These coordination costs of headquarters managers introduce a size
cost for corporate hierarchies.
Suppose then that the organisation must deal with q problems per unit of time.
The team needs then q production managers in layer 0 and M top managers (problem
solvers and coordinators) at headquarters. The profits generated by this hierarchy with
Np production managers, each receiving a wage wp, and M top managers specialised
in ‘problem solving’ and coordination, receiving a wage wm is
pi = P (q)q − (wp + apzp) q − wmM. (4)
When the Np production managers have autonomy zp they must learn the zp most
common problems. It is also assumed that the learning technology is such that
5In other words, zm = 1.
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top managers know all the tasks that the production managers also know, and that
the knowledge overlaps. Whenever the production managers confront problems or
decisions for which they do not have enough information, so that they need help, a
communication cost h (for a helping cost) per question posed must be incurred. The
communication cost is only incurred when the problem could not be solved at first
and help must be sought. These communication costs depend on the specifics of the
organisational form and how agents interact in the organisation. First, the geographic
distance between the middle managers and the top managers matters. Second, the
social distance may well be affected by the ‘organisational culture’ of the firm. The
‘organisational culture’ can be defined as the formal and informal rules which influence
the cost and incentives of communication in the organisation. The formal rules may be
influenced by computerised information systems, routine and standardised procedures
for reporting, monitoring and auditing. The informal rules may be affected by the social
organisation of the firm, such as ways to organise and coordinate meetings, face-to-face
modes of interaction, and the diffusion of knowledge.
A production manager can deal with a fraction F (zp) of the tasks and passes on
(1−F (zp) to a top manager in the headquarters who spends therefore time h(1−F (zp)
helping each of the production managers assigned to him. Each top manager also
needs to coordinate production projects with the other top managers. For simplicity,
we assume that the time spent in this activity is proportional to the size of the firm
and given by ϕNp. Each top manager is endowed with 1 unit of time. Since there are
Np production managers, the time constraint of a particular top manager is given by
sh(1− F (zp)) + ϕNp = 1,
where s is the span of control, or ratio of middle managers per top manager s =
Np/M. The top manager spends sh(1 − F (zp)) time solving problems, and ϕNp time
coordinating. It follows that the necessary number of top managers to deal with a firm
of size N is simply given by
M =
h(1− F (zp))Np
1− ϕNp .
This constraint determines a trade-off between what production managers can do and
how many top managers are needed. The more knowledge is acquired by middle
managers, the smaller is sh(1−F (zp)) and the less top managers are needed. Note also,
that because of the costs of coordinating between projects, the size of top management
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increases more than proportionally with the ‘size’ of the organisation q.
The problem of the firm is to decide the size or span of the hierarchy (s), the degree
of worker autonomy (zp), and the scale of production q so as to maximise profits.
Substituting for M in equation (4), we obtain
pi(q, zp) =
[
P (q)− (wp + apzp)− h [1− F (zp)]wm
1− ϕq
]
q.
Let us define the average cost of production c(zp, q) by
c(zp, q) = wp + apzp + h
[1− F (zp)]wm
1− ϕq .
Therefore,
Max q,zppi(q, zp) = [P (q)− c(zp, q)] q. (5)
Putting R(q) = P (q)q, the first order conditions of this maximisation problem are6:
R′q(q)− c(zp, q)− c′q(zp, q)q = 0 (6)
− cz(zp, q) = 0. (7)
The solutions of this system provide the optimal level of production q∗ and
the optimal degree of decentralisation z∗p . To understand the intuition behind
these expressions, consider the condition (7) which characterises the optimal level of
autonomy z˜p(q) that minimises the average costs of production c(zp, q) given the scale
of production q. We can see that
cz(zp) = ap − hf(zp) wm
1− ϕq = 0,
6To have a well defined maximisation problem, we assume the following global concavity conditions
(i.e.: R”qq − 2c′q − c”qqq < 0, c”zz > 0, and ∆ = −
[
R”qq − 2c′q − c”qqq
]
c”zz −
[
c′z + c
”
zqq
]
c”zq > 0)
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or
z˜p(q) = f
−1
[
ap (1− ϕq)
hwm
]
.
As f(.) is a decreasing function of z, zp is obviously increasing in the communication
parameter h and in the top managers’ wages wm and decreasing in the training costs
of production managers ap. A more decentralised hierarchy (larger value of zp) allows a
firm to save on top managerial wages and communication costs at the expense of larger
training costs for the lower level workforce. Note also that z˜p(q) is increasing in the size
of the firm q. As the size of the firm increases, it is optimal to give more autonomy to
production managers to save on top managers’ time to coordinate projects. Condition
(7) is depicted as the upward sloping curve zz in Figure 2.
Consider next condition (6), which characterises the optimal scale of production
q˜(zp) for a given hierarchy zp. Taking derivatives of equation (6) with respect to zp, we
have
∂q˜(zp)
∂zp
=
c′z + c
”
zqq
R”qq − 2c′q − c”qqq
.
The denominator R”qq − 2c′q − c”qqq is negative while the numerator can be expressed as
c′z + c
”
zqq = ap − hf(zp)
wm
1− ϕq − hf(zp)ϕq
wm
[1− ϕq]2
= ap − hf(zp) wm
[1− ϕq]2 R 0
A rise in zp increases the training costs of production managers and lowers the time top
managers spend on solving problems. The first effect increases the marginal costs of
production and the second effect reduces these costs. This ambiguity on the marginal
costs of production is then reflected in the optimal scale of production q˜(zp). Condition
(6) is depicted as the inverted U-shaped curve qq in Figure 2. At small zp (at sufficient
centralisation), the cost savings on managers dominates the increase in training costs
and more decentralisation (an increase in zp) unambiguously increases output. At large
zp (at sufficient decentralisation), the reverse is the case and more decentralisation
lowers output. Note that at full decentralisation zp = 1, given that f(1) = 0, one
necessarily has c′z + c”zqq > 0 and therefore ∂q˜/∂zp < 0. A small move towards more
centralisation saves on the training costs of production managers, but has no effect at
the margin on the problem solving time of top managers. As a result, the marginal
costs of production decline and the optimal scale of production q˜ increases.
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Figure 2: The optimal size and level of decentralisation of the firm
zz 
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The solutions q∗ and z∗p of problem (5) are obtained when the two conditions q =
q˜(zp) (corresponding to curve qq) and zp = z˜p(q) (corresponding to curve zz) are
satisfied. For a well defined maximization problem of the profit function pi(q, zp) (see
the conditions in the Appendix), these two curves intersect as illustrated in Figure 2.
Note that at the optimal level of decentralisation z∗p , c′z = 0. Thus, ∂q˜(z∗p)/∂zp > 0 (as
c”zq = −hf(z∗p) am+wm[1−ϕq∗]2 < 0) and the two curves (qq) and (zz) intersect on the upward
sloping part of (qq).
To examine how changes in the economic environment affect the design of optimal
knowledge hierarchies z∗p and the scale of production of the firm q∗, we denote by
α and β the shifting parameters affecting, respectively, the revenue function R(q, α)
and the cost function c(zp, q, β)q of the firm. Typically, changes in α capture changes
in the trade and product market environment while changes in β capture changes
in parameters affecting the internal structure of the firm. We immediately get (see
Appendix A) that
∂q∗
∂α
=
c”zzR”qα
∆
;
∂z∗p
∂α
=
−c”zqR”qα
∆
.
As c”zz > 0, c”zq < 0 and ∆ > 0, it follows that changes in α affect q∗ and z∗p in the same
direction (positively when R”qα > 0 and negatively when R”qα < 0).
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Similarly one has
∂q∗
∂β
=
−c”zz
[
c′β + c
”
qβq
]
+ c”zβc
”
zqq
∆
;
∂z∗p
∂β
=
c”zq
[
c′β + c
”
qβq
]
+ c”zβ
[
R”qq − 2c′q − c”qqq
]
∆
whose sign depends on the sign of c′β, c”qβ, and c”zβ, namely how a change in β interacts
with average and marginal costs of production, as well as the decision to decentralize.
4 Knowledge Hierarchies and Product Markets
In this section we analyse how conditions in the product market influence the optimal
choice of the knowledge hierarchy. We examine first changes in the product markets
in q∗ and z∗p . As changes in the product market environment, we consider a more
liberal trade regime (an increase in market size L) as well as tougher product market
competition (an increase in the number of firms N).
Our firm competes in a product market as described in Section 2 with L consumers,
N monopolistic competitors with unit cost of production c and a degree of product
differentiation γ. The resulting inverse demand P (q) and revenue function of our firm
are
P (q, γ,N, c, L) =
2γ
2γ +N
+
N
2γ +N
c− γ
L
q
R(q) = P (q)q =
[
2γ
2γ +N
+
N
2γ +N
c− γ
L
q
]
q.
We derive then the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. i) The optimal output of the firm q∗ increases with market size L
and decreases with the number of competitors N, that is:
∂q∗
∂L
> 0 and
∂q∗
∂N
< 0
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ii) An increase in market size L leads to more decentralisation (an increase in z∗p),
while an increase in the number of competitors results in more centralisation (a decline
in z∗p), that is:
∂z∗p
∂L
> 0 and
∂z∗p
∂N
< 0
Proof: See the Appendix.
Intuitively, an increase in market size leads to a larger firm output. In the Ottaviano,
Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) model we use here to describe the market structure, mark-
ups are endogenous and are declining with market size when more firms enter and
compete more intensively in a larger market.7 The increase in firm size increases the
coordination costs of top managers and with it the opportunity costs of solving the
problems of production managers. As a consequence, it is optimal to increase the
fraction of tasks z∗p that the production managers have to solve and to adopt a more
decentralised hierarchy. An increase in the number of competitors reduces the firms’
market shares and output. As a result, the coordination costs at headquarters decline,
leading to more centralisation of tasks to the top managers (i.e., a lower value of z∗p).
Next, we consider how changes in the cost side parameters affect q∗ and z∗p in the
following proposition. As changes on the cost side, we examine changes in training
costs of production managers ap and in costs of communication h.
Proposition 4.2. i) An increase in the learning costs of production managers ap leads
to a lower optimal output and to more centralisation:
∂q∗
∂ap
< 0 and
∂z∗p
∂ap
< 0.
ii) An increase in communication costs h has an ambiguous effect on output and leads
to more decentralisation:
∂q∗
∂h
≷ 0 and
∂z∗p
∂h
> 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Intuitively, larger training costs of production managers ap increases production
costs and leads to a lower output. The resulting lower coordination costs enables the
7see Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) for more details.
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top managers to get more involved in solving the problems of the production managers
resulting in more centralization to headquarters (i.e., a lower value of z∗p). An increase
in communication costs h makes communicating in the firm more costly, resulting in
a more decentralised organisation. However, the effect of an increase in h on output
levels remains ambiguous. On the one hand, an increase in costs h increases production
costs, reducing the optimal scale of production q∗ of the firm (direct effect). On the
other hand, an increase in h results in a more decentralised hierarchy zp which allows
choosing a larger output level (indirect effect). We show in the Appendix that when the
hazard rate function f(z)/1−F (z) is decreasing at the optimal level of decentralisation
z∗p , the direct effect on output outweighs the indirect effect on output and an increase
in h lowers the optimal scale of production.
5 When Will Multinationals Transplant Their Mode of Organisation?
So far we have examined how our multinational firm (or any other firm) will organise its
knowledge hierarchy when it faces a monopolistic competitive environment in its home
market. In this section, we extend our analysis to examine the choice of organisational
form of a multinational firm operating both in its home market and in a foreign market
through a subsidiary. We want to explore the conditions under which the multinational
firm will adopt the same business model in the subsidiary as in the parent firm given
that the economic environment may differ in the home and host market. To do this,
we use the framework of knowledge hierarchies and market competition as developed
in the previous sections.
The multinational firm is assumed to have a competitive advantage compared to its
competitors in the market as its output is an imperfect substitute and is produced at
lower costs. From the monopolistic competition model of Section 2, we can derive the
inverse demand function of the multinational parent firm in the home market and for
its affiliate firm in the host country f . Assuming the home (foreign) market structure
is characterised by N competitors with production costs c and market size L (by N f ,
cf , and Lf for the foreign market), the residual demand for the parent firm in the home
market and for the subsidiary firm in the host market are given by
P (q) = P (q, c, L,N) =
2γ
2γ +N
+
N
2γ +N
c− γ
L
q and
P f (q) = P (q, cf , Lf , N f ) =
2γ
2γ +N f
+
N f
2γ +N f
cf − γ
Lf
q
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We assume that the parent and affiliate firm share the same headquarters in the home
market and both can rely on the multinational firm’s accumulated knowledge and
organisational experience. Hence, the parent and affiliate firm will have the same
communication costs (controlling for the geographic and cultural distance between the
home and host country).
Suppose now that the parent multinational firm faces the home market parameters
wp, ap, am, wm, L, N. Solving a problem as described in Section 3, the firm implements
a business model with an optimal knowledge hierarchy (zOp ). Suppose further that
the multinational firm considers selling its product in a foreign market f through
a subsidiary operating in that market. Assuming that the subsidiary will be also
operating under monopolistic competition, the foreign host market conditions can be
summarised by the parameters wfp , afp , wfm, Lf , N f reflecting local cost and demand
features. The subsidiary firm faces the same problem of knowledge hierarchy as the
parent firm. In order to produce effectively, production managers need to solve
problems or to transmit such problems to top level managers who have greater abilities
to do so.
Two features, however, are specific to the multinational firm. First, we assume that
the top management of the subsidiary firm remains located in the home country at
the headquarters of the parent firm. The subsidiary firm is viewed as a division of
the firm located in the host country. Hence wfm = wm. Second, we assume that the
costs of communication with the subsidiary firm hf are affected by the organisational
capital of the multinational firm hO = h0 (which is an intangible asset of the firm) on
the one hand, and by the distance between the affiliate firm and headquarters, on the
other. We put hf = hO(1+ tf ), where tf > 0 reflects the fact that communication costs
increase with increasing geographical and cultural distance between the home and host
countries. The corporate organisation of the multinational firm is illustrated in Figure
3.
We ask now whether the multinational firm will or will not transplant its
organisational form (zOp ) to the subsidiary in the host market given that there is a
fixed cost of changing the organisational form of K.8
8The idea here is that the firm has an organisational routine of how to communicate in solving
problems, a routine which involves certain costs of learning and carrying out the new routines when
the organisational form is changed. K is supposed to reflect these costs.
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Figure 3: The Organisation of the Multinational Corporation
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The problem can be restated as determining the conditions under which
Maxq,z pi
f (q, z)−Maxq pif (q, zOp ) < K
holds, where
pif (q, z) =
[
P f (q)− (wfp + afpz)− hf [1− F (z)]wm1− ϕq
]
q.
In general terms, it will be convenient to denote by αf , βf the shifting parameters
affecting the conditions in product and factor markets in country f . Typically, αf ∈{
cf , Lf , N f
}
and βf ∈ {wfp , afp , wfm}.
Denote by
Π(z, αf , βf ) = Maxqpi(q, z, α
f , βf ) = Maxq
[
P (q, αf )− c(z, q, βf )] q
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the maximal profit function for a given hierarchy z, and by
q˜f (z) = Argmaxq
[
P (q, αf )− c(z, q, βf )] q,
the corresponding optimal production scale, which can be derived from the first order
condition
R′q(q, α
f )− c(z, q, βf )− c′q(z, q, βf )q = 0. (8)
Denote by z˜fp (q) the optimal level of decentralisation that minimises the average costs
of production c(z, q, βf ), for a given production scale q, that is obtained from the
following first order condition.
− cz(zp, q, βf ) = 0 (9)
Solving equations (8) and (9), we derive the optimal level of production q∗f and
the optimal degree of decentralisation z∗fp in the affiliate firm facing the host market
conditions αf , βf .
The condition for transplanting the organisational form is then
MaxzΠ(z, αf , βf )− Π(zOp , αf , βf ) < K, (10)
which requires that the increase in profit from changing the organisational form in the
subsidiary firm is smaller than its costs. When this condition is met, the multinational
firm replicates the parent firm’s business model in the subsidiary firm.
Now consider the case when the optimal hierarchy in the subsidiary in the host
country is more decentralised than that of the parent firm in the home country, that
is,
zOp < z
∗f
p .
This condition is met when, everything else being equal, communication costs between
headquarters and affiliate firms tf are sufficiently large.9 When communication costs
are sufficiently large, the optimal organisational form requires the subsidiary firm to
9Table 5 of the Appendix B shows that this assumption is indeed supported by our data as
subsidiary firms are more decentralised than parent firms.
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save on communication costs by decentralising and letting production managers solve
a wider scope of problems.
As a result,
q∗f > q˜f (zOp ) :
the optimal output of the subsidiary firm when it fully adjusts its organisational form
to the host market conditions q∗f is larger than it would be if it had transplanted the
organisational form from the parent firm q˜f (zOp ).
From this follows the first result.
Result 1: A multinational firm with a more decentralised hierarchy is more likely
to transplant its business model to its affilliate firm in a host country.
The prediction follows immediately from the assumption that z∗fp > zOp , since an
increase in zOp makes (10) more likely. In other words, an increase in the level of
decentralisation in the parent firm zOp reduces the organisational gap between the parent
firm’s level of decentralisation and the level of decentralisation of the affiliate that is
optimally adjusted to the host market conditions zf∗p − zOp . This makes it more likely
that the multinational firm transplants its organisational form to its subsidiary.
5.1 Market Size in the Home and the Host Country
We now consider the conditions under which (10) is more or less relaxed when the
parameters capturing the product market and cost conditions in the home country
{α, β} and the host country {αf , βf} vary. Using the envelope theorem for V (αf , βf ) =
MaxzΠ(z, α
f , βf ), the impact of αf on the decision to transplant is given by the sign
of
R′α(q
∗f , αf )−R′α(q˜f (zOp ), αf ).
Given that q∗f > q˜f (zOp ), this will depend on the sign of R
′′
αq(q, α
f ). When R′′αq(q, αf ) >
0 (< 0), an increase in αf makes it less (more) likely that the firm transplants its
organisational form to the subsidiary.
Similarly, the impact of βf on the decision to transplant is given by the sign of
−cβ(z∗fp , q∗f , βf )q∗f + cβ(zOp , q˜f (zOp ), βf )q˜f (zOp ).
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Given that q∗f = q˜f (z∗fp ), and zOp < z∗fp , it will depend on the sign of[
cβ + c
”
βqq
]
q˜f ′(z) + c”βz q˜
f (z)
and
q˜f ′(z) =
c′z + c
”
zqq
f
R”qq − 2c′q − c”qqqf
.
When
[
cβ + c
”
βqq
]
q˜f ′(z) + c”βz q˜
f (z) > 0 ( < 0), an increase in βf makes it more (less)
likely that the firm transplants its organisational form to the subsidiary.
We have then the following result.
Result 2: A multinational firm is less likely to transplant its business model to an
affiliate firm operating in a host country with a larger market size Lf .
Proof: See the Appendix.
In a larger host market, it hurts the profits of the subsidiary more when it
operates with an organisational form that is not optimally adjusted to the host market
conditions. When the subsidiary operates with the same organisational form as the
parent firm in its host market, each unit of output of the subsidiary is sold with a lower
profit margin, reducing total profits when more units of output are sold in a larger host
market. Therefore, the gain from changing the organisational form in the subsidiary
is more likely to outweight the cost and the multinational firm does not transplant its
business model to its affiliates in larger host markets.
Result 3 summarises the organisational response of the multinational corporation
to changes in the home market size. More specifically, we obtain:
Result 3: Assuming zf∗p > zOp , a multinational firm with a larger home market L
is more likely to transplant its business model to an affiliate.
Proof: See the Appendix.
As we show in Proposition 4.1, a multinational parent firm operating in a larger
home market adopts a more decentralised hierarchy (i.e., larger zOp ). This reduces
the organisational gap with the affiliate firm zf∗p − zOp making it more likely that the
multinational firm transplants its organisational form to the affiliate firm.
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5.2 Market Competition in the Home and the Host Country
We summarize the impact of the competitive conditions in the home and host country
in the following results.
Result 4: (a) A multinational firm is more likely to transplant its business model
to an affiliate firm facing tougher competition in its host country (larger number of
competitors N f in the host market). (b) A multinational firm facing a larger number
of competitors in its home market is less likely to transplant its business organisation.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Intuitively, when competition intensifies in the host country, the affiliate firm loses
market share and sells fewer units of output. When the affiliate firm produces less
output, headquarters’ managers allocate less time to coordination and have more time
to supervise the projects of production managers, leading to less autonomy in the
affiliate firm. The resulting more centralised hierarchy of the affiliate firm reduces
the organisational gap with the parent firm zf∗p − zOp , making it more likely that
the multinational will transplant its organisational form to the affiliate firm. A
multinational firms facing more competitors in its home market produces lower output
with more supervision and less coordination, resulting in a larger organisational gap and
a lower likelihood of exporting its business organisation to the host country affiliate.
5.3 Distance and Communication
In Result 5 we turn to the impact of distance and communication on the decision to
transplant the mode of organisation to the host country. More specifically, we obtain:
Result 5: The more costly is the communication between multinational headquar-
ters and the affiliate firm hf , the less likely it is that the multinational firm transplants
its organisational form to the affiliate firm. This holds, however, only when the host
market is sufficiently large (when the affiliate firm is sufficiently large).
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Proof: See the Appendix.
An increase in communication costs hf has two opposing effects on the likelihood to
transplant the business organisation to the affiliate firm. First, from Proposition 4.2, a
larger hf makes more decentralisation of the affiliate firm desirable (i.e., a larger zf∗p ).
As such, this tends to increase the ‘organisational gap’ zf∗p − zOp with the parent firm
and thus make it less likely that the multinational firm transplants. At the same time,
however, a larger hf increases production costs and reduces profits. Profits decline
more in affiliate firms with larger output. We have already shown that the optimal
output level of the affiliate firm is smaller when it transplants its organisational form
than when it optimally adjusts the organisational form to the host market conditions
(i.e., q˜f (zOp ) < q∗f ). Therefore, profits decline less under organisational transfer than
under perfect organisational adjustment to the host market. This tends to increase the
benefits of transplanting the organisational form. We show in the Appendix that when
the size of the affiliate is sufficiently large, the ‘organisational gap effect’ outweighs the
‘profit effect’ and a larger hf makes it less likely that the multinational firm transplants
its business model to the affiliate firm.
5.4 Technology
Finally, we proceed to summarize the impact of the type of technology on the decision
to transplnat the mode of business organisation in the following result.
Result 6: A multinational firm transferring a more complex and innovative
technology to its affiliate firm is more likely to transplant its mode of organisation to the
affiliate firm. Hence, organisational transfer and technology transfer are complements.
Proof: See the Appendix.
A more complex or innovative technology increases the learning costs of problem
solving afp by production managers in the subsidiary firm, which makes a more
centralised organisation of the affiliate firm optimal (i.e., smaller zf∗p ). The resulting
smaller ‘organisational gap’ zf∗p −zOp with the parent firm makes it more likely that the
multinational firm transplants its organisational form to the affiliate firm.
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6 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we test the predictions of our theory against original data about 660
multinational firms in Austria and Germany with 2200 affiliate firms in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union. We first describe the original data we collected from a
survey among 660 multinational firms with 2200 affiliate firms in Eastern Europe.
We then derive the predictions from the theory we want to test. Here, we proceed
in two steps. First, we examine how the decision to transplant its organisational
form is influenced by the multinational’s corporate culture, communication costs, and
technology. Second, we analyse how a multinational firm’s decision to transplant its
organisational form is affected by the market size and competition in the host and
home countries.
6.1 The Data
We conducted a survey of 660 multinational firms in Austria and Germany with
2200 of their affiliate firms in Eastern Europe including Russia and the Ukraine and
other former Soviet Republics in the period 1990–2001. Due to the length of the
questionnaire, we personally visited the firms in Austria and Germany, or conducted
the interviews by phone. The data are a full population survey of multinational firms in
Austria and Germany investing in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Since
foreign investment activity in Eastern Europe started only with the fall of communism
in 1990 (under central planning, foreign ownership was prohibited), we were able to
obtain 80 percent of German foreign investment and 100 percent of Austrian foreign
investment in Eastern Europe during this period inspite of collecting detailed data on
the internal organisation of these multinational firms and their human resource policies.
The firms included in the sample are global corporations with at least two subsidiaries
outside of Austria, Germany, and Eastern Europe, respectively. In 1998–1999, about
90 percent of total outgoing foreign direct investment in Austria was reoriented to
Eastern Europe, while in Germany, Eastern Europe accounted for only about 4 to 5
percent of total outgoing foreign investment. This explains why the sample consists of
relatively more Austrian firms inspite of Austria’s being much smaller than Germany
in terms of population.
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6.1.1 Measuring Organisation, Communication, and Technology
The dataset is unique not only because of its scope but also because of the detailed
information on the internal organisation of multinational firms in general and their
corporate culture in particular.10 The data include matched parent and affiliate
information on the internal organisation and the multinationals’ human resource
policies. To our knowledge, it is the only existing dataset suitable for testing our
theory.
Measuring Transplantation We measure the transplantation of the parent firm’s
organisational form to the affiliate firm by asking the CEO at the headquarters of
the corporation, regarding the organisational form of the parent firm,: “Who decides in
your company about the following corporate decisions listed in Table 5 in Appendix B?
Please rank between 1, taken at headquarters, and 5, taken at the divisional level.” We
also asked, regarding the organisational form of the affiliate firm, ‘Who decides in your
company about the following decisions listed in Table 5 of the Appendix? Please rank
between 1, taken at the headquarters of the parent firm, and 5, taken by the manager
of the affiliate firm in the host country.’ The 13 corporate decisions are, decisions on
acquisitions, finances, new strategy, wage increase, R&D expenditure, budget, transfer
and product prices, introducing a new product, changing a supplier, hiring two and 20
new workers, respectively as well as hiring a new secretary. Responses ranged between
five hierarchical ranks with 1 as a centralised decision, taken entirely at headquarters,
and 5 as a decentralised decision, taken at the divisional/affiliate level (for a full listing
of the corporate decisions and their hierarchical rank in the affiliate and parent firms,
see Table 5 of the Appendix B).
Based on the information of the hierarchical rank of corporate decisions in the
parent and affiliate firms, we constructed our measure of transplantation of the
organisational form from parent firms to foreign affiliate firms. The dummy variable
full transplantation indicates whether or not the organisational form of the parent firm
is fully transplanted to the subsidiary. It takes the value of one if each of the 13
corporate decisions have the same hierarchical rank or if one of the decisions differs
in hierarchical rank between parent and subsidiary firms. Alternatively, we use a less
stringent measure of transplantation, full transplantation (broad measure), which takes
10For a detailed overview of all the variables and their descriptive statistics, see Tables 6 and 7 of
the Data Appendix B.
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a value of one if the hierarchical rank is the same for each corporate decision with at
most two exceptions. 11 Table 5 of the Appendix B shows the percentages of affiliate
firms in which a particular corporate decision is taken at the same hierarchical level
as in the parent firm. It is interesting to note that the most centralised and the most
decentralised corporate decisions appear to be transplanted most often to affiliate firms.
The very centralised decision over acquisitions and the very decentralised decision on
hiring a secretary are transplanted to more than 70 percent of the affiliate firms, while
the decisions on finances and R&D are least often transplanted to the affiliate firm.
Only in about half of the affiliate firms are these two decisions taken at the same
hierarchical level in the affiliate as in the parent firm.
The Level of Decentralisation We use the two survey questions on the hierarchical
level of corporate decisions in affiliate and parent firms to construct an overall measure
of the level of decentralisation of the decision making process in both the parent and the
affiliate firm. We calculate simple means from the available scores of the 13 decisions
in the parent and affiliate firms and call it the decentralisation of parent firm and the
decentralisation of affiliate firm, respectively. Table 5 of the Appendix B shows that
the most centralised decision is the decision on acquisitions with a mean ranking of 1.34
and 1.41 for parent and subsidiary firms, respectively, followed by the decision on a new
strategy (with a respective mean ranking of 1.90 and 1.88). Not surprisingly, the most
decentralised decisions tend to be the decision on hiring a secretary (mean ranking
of 4.15 and 4.65) and the decision on hiring two new workers, whereas the decision
on R&D and the decision to introduce a new product tend to be taken cooperatively
between headquarters and divisional/subsidiary managers in the host country (with a
respective mean ranking of 2.58 and 2.80). It is interesting to note that affiliate firms
tend to be more decentralised than parent firms in Germany and Austria.
Other Measures of Corporate Culture
Human Resource Policies Our survey includes further information on the cor-
porate culture of the multinational firm. The variables incentive salary in parent
firm and incentive bonus in parent firm are dummy variables that take a value of
1 if a parent firm has a human resource policy in place to incentivise its employees
11For a robustness check with alternative measures of transplantation see Table 8 of the Data
Appendix B
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for performance through performance based wage increases and/or one-off bonuses.
While bonuses are used in more than one-third of parent firms, performance based pay
increases are relatively rare, being in place in only 14% of parent firms (see Tables 6
and 7 of Appendix B). We use these variables to proxy for the cost of a change in
the organisational form. The idea is that firms with explicit human resource policies
are likely to have a stronger corporate culture which is supposed to be more costly to
change.
Communication Costs As a proxy for communication costs, we use the variable
distance between parent and subsidiary firms which is defined by the geographic
distance between the capitals of the countries where the parent firm and the subsidiary
firm are located. Distance is supposed to capture not only the costs of face-to-face
communication but also cultural differences between the parent firms and the host
regions. The further away the foreign affiliate firm from the headquarters firm, the
more costly is communication between them. The average distance between parent
and affiliate firms is over 900 kilometres (see Tables 6 and 7 of Appendix B).
Technology and Type of FDI In our survey we also asked the parent firms to
provide us with information on the nature of the technology tranferred to subsidiary
firms. The dummy technology is innovative takes a value of one if the technology
is new, a dummy technology is established takes a value of one if the technology is
relatively established and a dummy technology is outdated refers to a fully established or
even outdated technology. Alternatively, we ask parent firms to indicate the headstart
they have in the technology over their competitors in terms of how difficult it is for
competitors to copy the technology. Easy-to-copy technology is a dummy variable that
takes a value of one if the transferred technology is easy to copy. In most cases, the
transferred technology is either established (60%) or outdated (32%), but this does not
necessarily mean that it is easy to copy. In fact, easily copied technology can only be
found in about one-third of affiliate firms (see Tables 6 and 7 of Appendix B).
Furthermore, the variable no intra-firm trade is a dummy variable equal 1 when
there is no intra-firm trade between the parent and subsidiary firms. It indicates that
the affiliate firm is a horizontal foreign direct investment. This variable singles out
cases in which the output of an affiliate firm is not used as a (specialised) input for the
parent firm but is rather sold on the host market or on a third market. Interestingly,
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around two-thirds of affiliate firms in our sample are horizontal FDI in which affiliate
firms do not export their products to parent firms.
Finally, the size of the multinational corporation is measured by the number of
employees as the size of parent firm and the size of affiliate firm. As expected, parent
firms are usually much larger than affiliate firms: the average number of employees in
parent firms reaches 7000, while it is only around 350 in affiliate firms.
6.1.2 Measuring the Size of Host and Home Markets
To measure the size of a host market, we use population and GDP of the host
country obtained from World Development Indicators (WorldBank, 2011) and denote
the variables population of host country and GDP of host country, respectively. The
largest host country in terms of both GDP and population is Russia, while the smallest
host countries are Estonia and Slovenia (in terms of population) and Tadjikistan and
Moldavia (in terms of GDP). We define a dummy variable large host country to take
a value of one if a host country has the same or larger population than the medium
host country in our sample which is the Czech Republic with a population of 10.3
million. Since our parent firms are located either in Austria or Germany, we use a
dummy variable parent is located in Germany to capture the effect of the larger home
market. Alternatively, we calculate a relative measure of the host country market size
with respect to the home market size as the population ratio (host/home) and GDP
ratio (host/home), respectively.
6.1.3 Measuring Market Competition
We use several data sources to proxy for product market competition and the exposure
to international trade. First, we obtain from our firm survey two subjective firm-
level measures of competition as perceived by parent and subsidiary firms. They are
dummy variables indicating for each parent and subsidiary firm whether the firm faces
many domestic competitors and many world competitors rather than few competitors,
respectively. Second, we use the AMADEUS database from BureauVanDijk (2005) to
calculate the sectoral Lerner index based on a large number of firms for the home and
host countries of the multinational firm at the three-digit ISIC industry level. The
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Lerner index is defined as (1 - average profits/sales), where the average is taken, first,
across all firms available in a three-digit industry in a specific country and, second, over
the years 1996 to 2000 (see Tables 6 and 7 of the Data Appendix B for a more formal
definition). Finally, we use sectoral trade data from the WITS UN COMTRADE and
data on domestic production from the INDSTAT 4 (UNIDO, 2008) and STAN (OECD,
2009) databases to proxy for the exposure to international trade of the sector of parent
and subsidiary firms. Based on these data, we calculate the import share (defined as
total imports divided by domestic production) and the export share (defined as total
exports divided by domestic production). The variables are calculated for each country
at the three-digit industry level. If data at the three-digit industry level are missing,
the two-digit level is used.
6.2 Predictions and Empirical Results
6.2.1 Corporate Culture, Distance, and Technology
We start by examining how the multinational firms’ corporate culture, distance,
and technology affect the decision to transplant their organisational form to other
countries.
Prediction 1: Multinational firms with a more decentralised hierarchy and a stronger
corporate culture (which makes a change of organisational form more costly) are more
likely to transplant their business model to their subsidiary in the host country.
Prediction 2: The more costly is the communication between the multinational
headquarters and the affiliate firm, the less likely it is that the multinational firm
transplants its organisational form to its affiliate firm. The prediction holds, however,
only when the host market is sufficiently large (when the affiliate firm is sufficiently
large).
Prediction 3: A multinational firm transferring a more complex and innovative
technology to its affiliate firm is more likely to transplant its organisational form to its
affiliate firm.
These predictions were derived in Result 1, Result 5, and Result 6 of the previous
section.
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To test Predictions 1 to 3, we consider the following econometric model of the
probability of transplanting the organisational form to the affiliate firm in the host
country.
Prob(transijk) = ∂1+∂2decijk+∂3incijk+∂4distijk+∂5distijk∗hostijk+∂6techijk+∂7w′ijk+νijk
(11)
Here, transijkis a dummy variable taking the value 1 for a multinational firm which
has fully transplanted its organisational form to its affiliate firm, i.e., when all corporate
decisions except one have the same hierarchical rank in the affiliate firm as in the
parent firm, and zero otherwise.12 i denotes the firm, j denotes the home country,
and k denotes the host country. decijk indicates the level of decentralisation in the
parent firm, i.e., the mean of a ranking between 1 (centralised) and 5 (decentralised)
of corporate decisions depending on whether the CEO or the divisional manager in
the firm take the decision. incijk is a dummy variable indicating the cost of changing
the organisational form. It is captured by whether the parent multinational firm has
an explicit human resource policy in place. distijk measures the communication costs
between parent and affiliate and is given by the geographic distance between the parent
and affiliate firms. hostijk is a dummy variable with the value 1 when the host country
is large and has a population above the host countries’ median population, and zero
otherwise. techijk indicates that the technology transferred to the affiliate firm is
innovative rather than established or outdated. w′ijk is a vector of controls and νijk is
an error term. In light of Predictions 1, 2, and 3, we test for the hypotheses ∂2 > 0
and ∂3 > 0, ∂4 < 0 and ∂5 < 0, and for ∂6 > 0.
Our main findings are given in Table 2 which presents probit maximum likelihood
estimates of equation 11. All p-values are computed allowing for heteroskedasticity at
the firm level. Furthermore, all regressions include a set of industry dummies as well
as host country fixed effects. We also include additional firm-level controls to avoid
omitted variable bias. The additional firm level covariates are no intra-firm trade and
the log of the number of employees in parent and affiliate firms as a measure of firm size.
The size of the multinational corporation does not appear to influence the probability
of transplanting their organisational form, while parent firms transplant significantly
more often to affiliate firms when affiliate firms are a horizontal investment and do not
12See the results with several alternative measures of transplanting the mode of organisation in
Table 8 of Appendix B.
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engage in intra-firm trade. Columns 1 to 3 test Prediction 1. The estimated coefficients
on decentralisation in parent firm and on incentive salary parent firm are, as predicted
by the theory, positive and highly significant at conventional levels, suggesting that
more decentralised parent firms with larger costs of changing their organisational form
tend to transplant their business model significantly more often. We measure human
resources by whether or not multinational firms incentivise their workers by having
performance based wages (column 2) or bonuses (column 3) in place. The latter two
variables are two ways of measureing the corporate culture of a multinational firm.
We assume that multinationals with explicit human resource policies have a stronger
corporate culture and thus it will be more costly to change the organisation in the
affiliate firm. To get a sense of the economic importance of each of the regressors, we
report the marginal effects in the last column of Table 2. An increase in the level of
decentralisation of the parent firm by one rank (an increase in hierarchical rank from
2 to 3, for example) increases the probability of transplanting the organisational form
by 11 percentage points, while multinational firms which use incentive wages to reward
for performance are 39 percentage points more likely to transplant the organisational
form.
Columns 4 and 6 test Prediction 2. The estimated coefficient on distance is already
by itself negative and significant, suggesting that when the affiliate firm’s distance to
the parent firm doubles, the probability of transplanting decreases by 8 percentage
points. When we interact distance with the large host market dummy, the negative
effect becomes stronger, as predicted by the theory. The interaction of distance with
the large subsidiary dummy, as an alternative of measuring the size of the host market,
is however, not significant.
Finally, in columns 7 to 9 we test Prediction 3. The dummy variables technology
is innovative or established rather than outdated are both positive and significant,
suggesting that technology transfer and organisational transfer go hand in hand. The
probability of transplanting increases most when the technology is innovative (when the
technology is innovative rather than outdated the probability of transplanting increases
by 32 percentage points (see the last column of Table 2). A similar picture emerges from
the alternative measure of technology easy to copy. As predicted by the theory, the
probability of transplanting declines when a competitor can easily copy the technology.
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6.2.2 Market Size
Next, we study the relationship between the probability of transplanting the organisa-
tional form and the size of the market, which is summarised in Prediction 4.
Prediction 4: (a) A multinational firm is less likely to transplant its business model
to an affiliate firm in a host country with a larger market size, (b) while it is more
likely to transplant from a larger home market.
The prediction was derived in Results 2 and 3 of the theory section.
To test Prediction 4, we proceed with the following econometric specification.
Prob(transijk) = θ1 + θ2∇′ijk + θ3 log popijk + θ4germanyijk + θ5w′ijk+ ∈ijk
Here, ∇′ijk is a vector of the organisational variables we have included to test
Predictions 1–3 and pop is the size of the population in host countries as a measure of
market size. The dummy germany takes a value of 1 if the home country is Germany
and 0 when it is Austria. In light of Prediction 4, we test for θ3 < 0 and θ4 > 0.
Table 3 reports the findings of testing Prediction 4. Columns 2 and 3 examine
how the size of the host country affects the probability of transplanting. As predicted
by the theory, multinational firms are less likely to transplant their organisational
form to host countries that arelarger in terms of either population or of GDP. The
relationship is highly significant. Moreover, in column 4, the German dummy is positive
and highly significant, suggesting that multinational firms originating from the larger
home market are more likely to transplant their organisational form. Alternatively,
in columns 5 and 6 we replace the absolute measure by a relative measure of market
size by calculating the population ratio or GDP ratio of host to home country. The
relationship is negative and highly significant, suggesting that if the population ratio
increases by 1, the probability of transplanting the organisational form declines by
2 percentage points (see the last column for the marginal effects). In our data this
means that if a German multinational firm moves its affiliate from the Ukraine (with
a population ratio of 0.6) to Russia (with a population ratio of 1.8), the probability
of transplanting decreases by around 2.4 percentage points. Or alternatively, if an
Austrian multinational firm moves its affiliate from Bulgaria (with a population ratio
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of 1) to Romania (with a population ratio of 2.8), the probability of transplanting
declines by around 3.6 percentage points.
6.2.3 Market Competition
We proceed to examine how market competition and international trade influences a
multinational firm’s decision to tranplant its organisational form, which is summarised
in the next prediction.
Prediction 5: (a) A multinational firm is more likely to transplant its business model
to its affiliate firm facing tougher competition in its host market, (b) while it is less
likely to transplant from a more competitive home market.
The prediction was derived in Result 4 of the theory section. To test Prediction
5, we add several firm and sector specific proxies for competition and trade to the
econometric specification 12. The results are given in Table 4. Columns 1 to 3 report
results with the firm specific measures of competition and trade. As predicted by the
theory, multinational firms transplant their business model significantly more often
when they are faced with many foreign and domestic competitors in their host markets
and they transplant their organisational form with lower probability when they are
facing many foreign and domestic competitors in their home market. In column 2
many world competitors in the parent market becomes significant only, when we exclude
the technology variables from the regression. Not surprisingly, the intensity of foreign
competition affiliate firms face in their host markets is correlated with how innovative
the technology is that they receive from their parent firms. Domestic competition in
host and home markets of multinational firms is an important driver of organisational
transfer to the host economies of Eastern Europe. When subsidiary firms face
many domestic competitors in the host markets rather than few, the probability of
transplanting increases by 18.5 percentage points, while many domestic competitors in
the parent market lowers this probability by around 9 percentage points (see the last
column of Table 4).
For robustness, we introduce several measures of competition at the sectoral level.
In columns 4 and 5 we replace the firm-level measures of competition by the Lerner
index at the sectoral 3-digit level. The results are robust with the subsidiary market
Lerner but not for the parent market Lerner as the sign of the coefficient turns.
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Table 3: The Size of Host and Home Markets
Dependent Variable Full transplantation1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Marginal
effects2
Log (Size of subsidiary firm) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 1.6
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13)
Log (Size of parent firm) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.5
(0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.36) (0.55) (0.45)
Decentralisation of parent firm 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 10.8
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Incentive salary in parent firm 1.18*** 1.18*** 1.18*** 1.03*** 1.13*** 1.12*** 36.6
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log (distance) -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.54*** -0.35*** -0.39*** -8.2
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Technology is established3 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 9.7
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Technology is innovative3 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.94*** 0.98*** 0.97*** 31.2
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
No intra-firm trade 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 8.9
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log (Population of host country) -1.16***
(0.00)
Log (GDP of host country) -1.04***
(0.00)
Parent is located in Germany 0.64***
(0.00)
Population ratio (host/home) -0.08*** -2.0
(0.01)
GDP ratio (host/home) -0.86***
(0.00)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 892 892 892 892 892 892
Pseudo R2 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.304 0.296 0.298
Notes: Probit estimates with robust standard errors. The p-values are reported in parentheses. See Table 6 in Appendix B for the
definition of the variables.
1 A dummy that takes a value of one if the organisational form is fully transplanted and zero otherwise. The organisational form is fully
transplanted if each corporate decision obtained the same hierarchical rank for the parent firm as for the subsidiary firm or if only one
corporate decision differs.
2 Marginal effects at mean in percentage points for continuous variables and discrete changes from zero to one in percentage points for
dummy variables based on the regression in column (5).
3 Technology is outdated is the omitted category of technology.
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In column 5 we exclude the now insignificant population ratio which appears to be
correlated with the Lerner index. However, parent market Lerner remains positive
and significant when the population ratio is excluded. We proceed to include import
and export ratios as sectoral measures of the exposure to international competition in
columns 6 and 7. Now, the export share-parent has the expected negative sign and it
is significant while import competition does not appear to be significant. However, the
sample collapses to 260 observations, since the sectoral trade data were available only
for a limited number of observations. We have the most confidence in the firm-level
measures of competition, in light of the recent theory of heterogeneity and international
trade, which suggests that firms vary in the amount of competition they face at the
firm level.13
7 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the conditions under which multinational firms transplant
their business organisation to their affiliate firms in host countries. In concluding, we
want to return to the puzzle we raised in the Introduction, that there is a surprisingly
high proportion of multinational firms that do not transplant their mode of organisation
to host countries. In our analysis we found that three factors stand out as drivers
of organisational transfer to host countries. First, multinational firms with a strong
corporate culture are 37 percentage points more likely to transplant their organisational
form to host countries. A strong corporate culture makes it costly for multinational
firms to change the organisational form and to choose a business model for affiliate
firms which is optimally adjusted to the host market conditions. Among Austrian and
German multinational firms in our data, however, only a minority (14 percent) face
high costs of changing their organisational form by having human resource policies in
place incentivising their workers (which is our proxy of corporate culture).
Second, multinational firms which transfer a new and highly innovative technology
to affiliate firms in the host country are 31 percentage points more likely to export
the business organisational form abroad. Our estimates suggest that technology
transfer and organisational transfer go hand in hand. A new technology increases the
13see Melitz (2003).
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Table 4: Market Competition
Dependent Variable Full transplantation1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Marginal
effects2
Log (Size of subsidiary firm) 0.05 0.04 0.08* 0.06 0.06 0.25*** 0.24** 1.7
(0.27) (0.36) (0.09) (0.19) (0.20) (0.01) (0.01)
Log (Size of parent firm) 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.22** -0.22** -0.5
(0.27) (0.75) (0.48) (0.52) (0.77) (0.02) (0.01)
Decentralisation of parent firm 0.51*** 0.43*** 0.51*** 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 10.1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Incentive salary in parent firm 1.38*** 1.39*** 1.12*** 1.21*** 1.15*** 2.06*** 2.35*** 33.4
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log (distance) -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.33*** -0.45*** -0.54*** -0.45** -0.39** -6.6
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
Technology is established3 0.50*** 0.62*** 0.33** 0.33** -0.02 -0.02 11.6
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.94) (0.94)
Technology is innovative3 1.15*** 1.04*** 1.09*** 1.06*** 0.55 0.57 30.8
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.28)
No intra-firm trade 0.44*** 0.35** 0.29* 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.76*** 0.63** 5.4
(0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
Population ratio (host/home) -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.08** -0.01 0.05 0.04 -1.6
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.76) (0.44) (0.50)
Parent is located in Germany 0.29
(0.16)
Many world competitors-subs. 0.20 0.43***
(0.19) (0.00)
Many world competitors-par. -0.62*** -0.41***
(0.00) (0.00)
Many dom. competitors-subs. 0.91*** 18.5
(0.00)
Many dom. competitors-par. -0.45*** -8.7
(0.01)
Subsidiary market Lerner 0.05* 0.05*
(0.05) (0.08)
Parent market Lerner 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.00) (0.00)
Import share-subsidiary 0.15
(0.48)
Import share-parent -1.31
(0.19)
Export share-subsidiary 0.00
(0.99)
Export share-parent -2.42**
(0.01)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 852 964 863 770 770 260 260
Pseudo R2 0.350 0.297 0.337 0.364 0.366 0.357 0.371
Notes: Probit estimates with robust standard errors. The p-values are reported in parentheses. See Table 6 in Appendix B for the
definition of the variables.
1 A dummy that takes a value of one if the organisational form is fully transplanted and zero otherwise. The organisational form is fully
transplanted if each corporate decision obtained the same hierarchical rank for the parent firm as for the subsidiary firm or if only one
corporate decision differs.
2 Marginal effects at mean in percentage points for continuous variables and discrete changes from zero to one in percentage points for
dummy variables based on the regression in column (3).
3 Technology is outdated is the omitted category of technology.
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training costs of production managers in the affiliate firms, making a more centralised
organisation in the affiliate firms more desirable. As the latter makes affiliate firms’
organisational forms more similar to those in the parent firms (as parent firms are
more centralised), this makes organisational transfer more likely. However, among the
multinational firms in our sample, only very few (8 percent) describe the technology
they transfer to host countries as new and highly innovative, while the majority of
firms (60 percent) perceive the technology as established. Thus, the rare occurence of
multinational firms with a strong corporate culture and with innovative technologies
have both contributed to the low frequency of transplanting the mode of organisation
to the affiliate firms in host countries.
Lastly, we find that multinational firms which invest in host countries with tough
competition are 18.5 percentage points more likely to export their organisational form
to these countries.
These findings suggest that organisational transfer between countries may be
promoted by targeting multinational firms with strong corporate culture and innovative
technologies. At the same time, host countries can influence the likelihood of such
organisational transfer by creating a more competitive market environment in their
countries once multinationals have decided to locate a subsidiary in these markets.
This will be particularly desirable for large host countries which are at a disadvantage
for obtaining organisational skills from their multinational investors. Whether, in fact,
such policies are welfare improving to the host countries is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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A Appendix: Theory
• i) The first order conditions of the firm’s problem are
R′q(q)− c(zp, q)− c′q(zp, q)q = 0 (12)
− c′z(zp, q) = 0. (13)
Total differentiation gives[
R”qq − 2c′q − c′′qqq −c′′qzq
−c′′qz −c′′zz
](
dq∗
dz∗p
)
=
[
−R′′qαdα +
(
c′β + c
′′
qβq
)
dβ
c′′zβdβ
]
or (
dq∗
dz∗p
)
=
1
∆
[
−c′′zz c′′qzq
c′′qz R
”
qq − 2c′q − c′′qqq
][
−R′′qαdα +
(
c′β + c
′′
qβq
)
dβ
c′′zβdβ.
]
The matrix
A =
[
R”qq − 2c′q − c′′qqq −c′′qzq
−c′′qz −c′′zz
]
is semi-definite negative when ∆ = − [R”qq − 2c′q − c′′qqq] c′′zz−(c′′qz)2 q > 0 (which comes
from the conditions ensuring a well defined maximization problem of the profit function
pi(q, z)). It follows immediately that
∂q∗
∂α
=
c”zzR”qα
∆
;
∂z∗p
∂α
=
−c”zqR”qα
∆
(14)
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and
∂q∗
∂β
=
−c”zz
[
c′β + c
”
qβq
]
+ c”zβc
”
zqq
∆
; (15)
∂z∗p
∂β
=
c”zq
[
c′β + c
”
qβq
]
+ c”zβ
[
R”qq − 2c′q − c”qqq
]
∆
.
• Proof of Proposition 1: Assuming our parametrisation of the inverse demand
function P (q),
P (q, γ,N, c, L) =
2γ
2γ +N
+
N
2γ +N
c− γ
L
q,
we obtain the revenue function of the firm:
R(q) = P (q)q =
[
2γ
2γ +N
+
N
2γ +N
c− γ
L
q
]
q,
which provides
R”qL = 2
γ
L2
> 0 ; R”qN =
2γ(c− 1)
[N + 2γ]2
< 0.
Using (12), the result of Proposition 1 follows immediately QED.
• Proof of Proposition 2: Simple differentiation of the cost function
c(zp, q) = wp + apzp + h
[1− F (zp)] (am + wm)
1− ϕq
provides the following expressions.
c′ap = zp ; c
′
h =
[1− F (zp)] (am + wm)
1− ϕq ; cz = ap − hf(zp)
am + wm
1− ϕq ;
cq = h
ϕ[1− F (zp)] (am + wm)
[1− ϕq]2
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Also,
c”zap = 1, c”zh = −f(zp)
am + wm
1− ϕq < 0; (16)
czz = −hf ′(zp)am + wm
1− ϕq > 0;
c”zq = −hϕf(zp) (am + wm)
[1− ϕq]2 < 0, c”qap = 0; (17)
c”qh =
ϕ[1− F (zp)] (am + wm)
[1− ϕq]2 > 0;
c′′qq = 2h
ϕ2[1− F (zp)] (am + wm)
[1− ϕq]3 .
Now, using (13) and (16), one immediately gets
Sign
(
∂q∗
∂ap
)
= Sign
[−c”zzzp + c”zqq] < 0
Sign
(
∂z∗p
∂ap
)
= Sign
[
c”zqzp +
[
R”qq − 2c′q − c”qqq
]]
< 0.
Similarly, after substitution of (13), (16), and (17), one gets
Sign
(
∂q∗
∂h
)
= Sign
[−c”zz [c′h + c”qhq]+ c”zhc”zqq] ;
Sign
(
∂z∗p
∂h
)
= Sign
[
c”zq
[
c′h + c
”
qhq
]
+ c”zh
[
R”qq − 2c′q − c”qqq
]]
.
Therefore,
Sign
(
∂q∗
∂h
)
= Sign
[
hf ′(zp) (am + wm)
2 [1− F (zp)]
[1− ϕq]3 + f(zp) (am + wm)
2 h
ϕf(zp) (am + wm)
[1− ϕq]3 q
]
= Sign
[
f ′(zp)[1− F (zp)] + f 2(zp)ϕq
]
≷ 0.
As ϕq < 1, we have ∂q∗/∂h < 0 when f ′(zp) [[1− F (zp)]] + f 2(zp) < 0, which is true
when the hazard rate function f(zp)/(1− F (zp)) is decreasing at zp.
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Conversely,
Sign
(
∂z∗p
∂h
)
= Sign
 −hϕf(zp)(am+wm)[1−ϕq]2 [ [1−F (zp)](am+wm)[1−ϕq]2 ]
−f(zp)am+wm1−ϕq
[
R”qq − 2hϕ[1−F (zp)](am+wm)[1−ϕq]2 − c”qqq
] 
and
Sign
(
∂z∗p
∂h
)
= Sign
[ −f(zp)am+wm1−ϕq R”qq + f(zp)am+wm1−ϕq c”qqq
+hϕf(zp)[1−F (zp)](am+wm)
2
[1−ϕq]3
[
1−2ϕq
1−ϕq
] ]
= Sign
[
−f(zp)am + wm
1− ϕq R
”
qq + h
ϕf(zp)[1− F (zp)] (am + wm)2
[1− ϕq]4
]
> 0 .
QED.
• Results 2 and 4a:
The impact of the host market parameter αf on the probability of transplanting
the organisational form is given by the sign of R′′αq(q, αf ). More specifically, when
R
′′
αq(q, α
f ) > 0, an increase in αf leads to less transplanting to the affiliate firm.
Given our parametrisation of product market monopolistic competition in the affiliate
country, we get that
R”qLf = 2
γf
(Lf )2
> 0 ; R”qNf =
2γf (cf − 1)
[N f + 2γf ]2
< 0,
from which the conclusions for Results 2 and 3 follow immediately. QED.
• Result 3 and 4b :
From Proposition 1 we know that a multinational firm with a larger home market
size L is more likely to be decentralised and has a larger value of zOp . Assuming
that zf∗p > zOp , this tends to reduce the organisational gap zf
∗
p − zOp between the
optimal organisational structure of the affiliate and that of the parent firm, making
organisational transfer more likely.
Conversely, from Proposition 1, a multinational firm facing a larger number of
competitors in its home market is more centralised with a smaller value of zOp . As this
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increases the organisational gap zf∗p −zOp , which makes local adjustment more beneficial
to the affiliate, the likelihood of transplantation is thus reduced.
For the decision to transplant their organisational form (comparative statics on cost
side parameters): an increase in βf increases the likelihood of organisational transfer
when [
cβ + c
”
βqq
]
q˜′(z) + c”βz q˜(z) > 0 (18)
or [
cβ + c
”
βqq
] [
c′z + c
”
zqq
]
+
[
R”qq − 2c′q − c”qqq
]
c”βzq < 0.
• Result 5: Consider a change in the communication cost hf . Given (16), and
(17), we have that
[
c′h + c
”
hqq
] [
c′z + c
”
zqq
]
+
[
R”qq − 2c′q − c”qqq
]
c”hzq (19)
is given by
[1− F (zp)] (am + wm)
[1− ϕq]2 ap−R
”
qqf(zp)
am + wm
1− ϕq q+
hf(zp)[1− F (zp)] (am + wm)2
[1− ϕq]4 [2ϕq − 1] .
The first two terms are positive and the last one is also positive when ϕq > 1/2.
Hence, when the host market size Lf is large enough to ensure that ϕqf > 1/2, we
get that the sign of (19) is positive and the sign of (18) is negative. Consequently, an
increase in communication costs between the parent and the affiliate firm reduces the
likelihood of organisational transfer.14
• Result 6:
14Note that the condition on the host market size is sufficient but not necessary. Indeed, even for
values q < 1/2ϕ, but such that
ϕq >
1
2
− [1− ϕq]
2
2
ap
hf(0) (am + wm)
,
we have a positive sign for (19), leading to the same result on the likelihood of transplanting.
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Given that c′ap = zp, c”qap = 0 and c”zap = 1, we have that[
cap + c
”
apq
]
q˜′(z) + c”apz q˜(z) = zpq˜
′(z) + q˜(z) > 0
as q˜′(z) > 0 on the range [z0, zi]. Hence a larger value of ap increases the likelihood
of transplanting the organisational form to the subsidiary firm. QED.
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B Appendix: Data and Results
Figure 4: The Frequency of Transplanting Organisational Form
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Notes: The organisational form is fully transplanted if each corporate decision obtained the same hierarchical rank for the subsidiary firm
as for the parent firm or if only one corporate decision differs (i.e., 12 or 13 transplanted corporate decisions). It is partially transplanted
if from two to four corporate decisions differ in hierarchical rank (i.e., 9–11 transplanted corporate decisions) and the organisational form
is not transplanted if five or more corporate decisions are different (i.e., 0–8 transplanted corporate decisions).
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Table 5: Corporate Decisions in Subsidiary and Parent Firms
Corporate decision1 Affiliates with the same Mean level of decentralisation3
hierarchical rank as parent firms2 Affiliate firms Parent firms
on acquisitions 78% 1.41 1.34
to hire a new secretary 70% 4.65 4.15
to hire two new workers 64% 4.26 3.67
to change a supplier 61% 3.23 3.09
on transfer prices 61% 2.43 2.45
on budget 60% 2.72 2.70
to hire 20 new workers 59% 2.82 2.51
to introduce a new product 55% 2.80 2.76
on wage increase 55% 4.10 3.45
on product price 54% 3.75 3.48
on a new strategy 54% 1.88 1.90
financial decisions 52% 2.54 1.90
on R&D expenditure 51% 2.58 2.79
1 The corporate decisions listed were collected for both German and Austrian parent firms as well as all subsidiary firms and are sorted
from the most similar decisions in affiliate firms compared with parent firms to the least similar decisions.
2 Percentage of affiliate firms in which a particular decision is taken at the same hierarchical level as in parent firms.
3 Mean over the rank of one to five with one (centralised) meaning only the headquarters of the parent firm takes the decision, and five
(decentralised), the decision is delegated to the divisional manager (parent firm) or to the affiliate manager (affiliate firm).
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Table 6: Description of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Description
1. Organisation, Communication, and Technology
Corporate Culture
Full transplantation dummy that takes a value of one if the organisational form is fully transplanted
from the parent firm to its subsidiary and zero otherwise; full transplantation
means that either each corporate decision obtained the same hierarchical rank for
the parent firm as for the subsidiary firm or only one corporate decision differs
Full transplantation
(broad measure)
dummy that takes a value of one if the organisational form is fully transplanted
(in the broad sense) from the parent firm to its subsidiary and zero otherwise;
full transplantation in the broad sense means that either each corporate decision
obtained the same hierarchical rank for the parent firm as for the subsidiary firm
or the rank differs for up to two corporate decisions
Decentralisation
of parent firm
mean of ranking between one (centralised) and five (decentralised) of several
corporate decisions depending on whether the headquarters (centralised) or the
divisional manager of the parent firm (decentralised) makes the decision; see
Table 5 for a listing of corporate decisions
Decentralisation
of subsidiary firm
mean of ranking between one (centralised) and five (decentralised) of several
corporate decisions depending on whether the headquarters of the parent firm
(centralised) or the subsidiary manager (decentralised) makes the decision; see
Table 5 for a listing of corporate decisions
Incentive salary
in parent firm
dummy that takes a value of one if the parent firm incentivises performance
through salary increases and zero otherwise
Incentive bonus
in parent firm
dummy that takes a value of one if the parent firm incentivises performance
though a one-off bonus payment and zero otherwise
Communication costs
Distance distance between the parent and the subsidiary firm in km
Technology
Technology a categorical variable with three categories: technology is outdated, established,
and new; a more detailed description of the categories follows
↪→ Technology is outdated dummy that takes a value of one if the technology of the investment project is
fully established or outdated and zero otherwise
↪→ Technology is established dummy that takes a value of one if the technology of the investment project is
relatively established and zero otherwise
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Variable Description
↪→ Technology is innovative dummy that takes a value of one if the technology of the investment project is
new and zero otherwise
Easy-to-copy technology dummy that takes a value of one if the technology of the investment project can
easily be copied and zero otherwise
No intra-firm trade dummy that takes a value of one if no intra-firm trade between the parent and
the subsidiary firm takes place and zero otherwise
The Size of the Multinational Corporation
Size of parent firm number of employees of parent firm
Size of subsidiary firm number of employees of subsidiary firm
2. The Size of Home and Host Markets
Population of host country population of the host country, reference year: 2000
GDP of host country GDP of the host country in USD, reference year: 2000
Large host country dummy that takes a value of one if population of the host market is equal to or
larger than the medium observation in our sample of 10.3 million (the population
of the Czech Republic) and zero otherwise
Parent is located
in Germany
dummy that takes a value of one if the parent firm is located in Germany and
zero otherwise
Population ratio (host/home) ratio of host country population to home country population, reference year: 2000
GDP ratio (host/home) ratio of host country GDP to home country GDP, reference year: 2000
−→ Source of population and GDP data: World Development Indicators (WorldBank, 2011)
3. Market Competition
Many domestic competitors
↪→ subsidiary/parent
dummy that takes a value of one if the subsidiary/parent firm has many
competitors at the domestic market and zero otherwise
Many world competitors
↪→ subsidiary/parent
dummy that takes a value of one if the subsidiary/parent firm has many
competitors worldwide and zero otherwise
Lerner
↪→ subsidiary/parent market
for a three-digit ISIC Rev. 3 industry j of country k:
Lernerjk =
1− 1
Njk
∑
i∈jk
profit before taxesi
operating revenuei
 ∗ 100%,
where Njk denotes the number of firms i in industry j of country k; a simple
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Variable Description
average over the years 1996 to 2000 is taken in addition; parent market and
subsidiary market Lerner denotes the Lerner index calculated for host countries
and for Austria/Germany, respectively
−→ Source of profit and revenue data: AMADEUS database (BureauVanDijk, 2005)
Import share
↪→ subsidiary/parent market
total imports divided by domestic production at the three-digit ISIC Rev. 3
level in host/home countries and averaged over the years 1996 to 2000; when the
three-digit level information is missing, the two-digit ISIC level is used
Export share
↪→ subsidiary/parent market
total exports divided by domestic production at the three-digit ISIC Rev. 3
level in host/home countries and averaged over the years 1996 to 2000; when the
three-digit level information is missing, the two-digit ISIC level is used
−→ Source of trade data: WITS - UN COMTRADE database (WorldBank, 2009)
−→ Source of production data: INDSTAT 4 (three-digit), STAN (two-digit) database (UNIDO, 2008; OECD, 2009)
−→ Source of CEO wages: Kienbaum Consulting
4. Other Variables
Country dummies country dummies for the location of subsidiary firm
Industry dummies (2d) two-digit industry dummies for the subsidiary firm based on ISIC Rev. 3
Notes: If not reported otherwise, the data come from a survey of 660 German and Austrian firms with 2200 investment projects in
Eastern Europe, conducted by the Chair of International Economics at the University of Munich.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs. with
dummy = 1
1. Organisation, Communication, and Technology
Corporate Culture
Full transplantation 1335 0.24 0 1 0.43 318
Full transplantation (broad measure) 1335 0.32 0 1 0.47 422
Decentralisation of parent firm 1472 2.81 1 5 0.84 .
Decentralisation of subsidiary firm 1388 2.95 1 5 0.69 .
Incentive salary in parent firm 1549 0.14 0 1 0.34 210
Incentive bonus in parent firm 1549 0.38 0 1 0.48 584
Communication Costs
Distance 2122 903.04 17 6000 799.24 .
Technology
Technology is outdated 1826 0.32 0 1 0.47 585
Technology is established 1826 0.60 0 1 0.49 1099
Technology is innovative 1826 0.08 0 1 0.27 142
Easy-to-copy technology 1931 0.35 0 1 0.48 672
No intra-firm trade 2123 0.67 0 1 0.47 1431
The Size of the Multinational Corporation
Size of parent firm 1993 6970.20 1 233000 25233.78 .
Size of subsidiary firm 1921 346.61 1 49000 1660.02 .
2. The Size of Host and Home Markets
Population of host country (millions) 2122 24.9 1.37 146.3 35.25 .
GDP of host country (billions US$) 2122 78.4 0.86 260 72.58 .
Large host country 0.56 0 1 0.50 1196
Parent is located in Germany 2123 0.56 0 1 0.50 1186
Population ratio (host/home) 2122 1.18 0.2 18.2 2.29 .
GDP ratio (host/home) 2122 0.17 0.0005 1.36 0.25 .
3. Market Competition
Many domestic competitors-subsidiary 1978 0.46 0 1 0.50 900
Many domestic competitors-parent 2058 0.46 0 1 0.50 940
↪→ Austria 936 0.45 0 1 0.50 424
↪→ Germany 1122 0.46 0 1 0.50 516
Many world competitors-subsidiary 1938 0.29 0 1 0.45 563
Many world competitors-parent 2010 0.73 0 1 0.45 1463
↪→ Austria 934 0.72 0 1 0.45 675
↪→ Germany 1076 0.73 0 1 0.44 788
Subsidiary market Lerner 1900 96.57 54.73 124.56 4.42 .
Parent market Lerner 2053 93.68 73.15 121.58 6.14 .
↪→ Austria 890 92.83 77.52 121.58 6.58 .
↪→ Germany 1163 94.32 73.15 119.61 5.69 .
Import share-subsidiary 827 0.67 0.0028 23.74 1.18 .
Import share-parent 1053 0.38 0.012 1.89 0.35 .
↪→ Austria 327 0.58 0.03 1.52 0.36 .
↪→ Germany 726 0.30 0.01 1.89 0.30 .
Export share-subsidiary 843 0.53 0.0039 25.17 1.07 .
Export share-parent 1053 0.40 0.01 1.05 0.26 .
↪→ Austria 327 0.47 0.04 1.00 0.30 .
↪→ Germany 726 0.37 0.01 1.05 0.24 .
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